Literature on information integration across databases tacitly assumes that the data in each database can be revealed to the other databases. However, there is an increasing need for sharing information across autonomous entities in such a way that no information apart from the answer to the query is revealed. We formalize the notion of minimal information sharing across private databases, and develop protocols for intersection, equijoin, intersection size, and equijoin size. We also show how new applications can be built using the proposed protocols.
INTRODUCTION
Information integration has long been an area of active database research [12, 16, 21, 27, 48] . So far, this literature has tacitly assumed that the information in each database can be freely shared. However, there is now an increasing need for computing queries across databases belonging to autonomous entities in such a way that no more information than necessary is revealed from each database to the other databases. This need is driven by several trends:
agency cannot indiscriminately open up its database to all other agencies. Privacy: Privacy legislation and stated privacy policies place limits on information sharing. However, it is still desirable to mine across databases while respecting privacy limits. We propose a new paradigm of minimal necessary information sharing across private databases. Intuitively, given a database query spanning multiple private databases, we wish to compute the answer to the query without revealing any additional information apart from the query result. We will sometimes relax this constraint to allow some minimal additional information to be revealed.
Motivating Applications
We give two prototypical applications to make the above paradigm concrete. Application 1: Selective Document Sharing Enterprise R is shopping for technology and wishes to find out if enterprise S has some intellectual property it might want to license. However, R would not like to reveal its complete technology shopping list, nor would S like to reveal all its unpublished intellectual property.
Rather, they would like to first find the specific technologies for which there is a match, and then reveal information only about those technologies. This problem can be abstracted as follows.
We have two databases DR and DS, where each database contains a set of documents. The documents have been preprocessed to only include the most significant words, using some measure such as term frequency times inverse document frequency [41] . We wish to find all pairs of similar documents dR 2 DR and dS 2 DS, without revealing the other documents. In database terminology, we want to compute the join of DR and DS using the join predicate fjdR dSj;jdRj; jdSj , for some similarity function f and threshold . The function f could be jdR dSj=jdRj + jdSj, for instance.
Many applications map to this abstraction. For example, two government agencies may want to share documents, but only on a need-to-know basis. They would like to find similar documents contained in their repositories in order to initiate their exchange.
Application 2: Medical Research
Imagine a future where many people have their DNA sequenced. A medical researcher wants to validate a hypothesis connecting a DNA sequence D with a reaction to drug G. People who have taken the drug are partitioned into four groups, based on whether or not they had an adverse reaction and whether or not their DNA contained the specific sequence; the researcher needs the number of people in each group. DNA sequences and medical histories are stored in databases in autonomous enterprises. Due to privacy concerns, the enterprises do not wish to provide any information about an individual's DNA sequence or medical history, but still wish to help with the research.
Assume that the table TR(person id, pattern) stores whether a person's DNA contains pattern D and TS(person id, drug, reaction) captures whether a person took drug G and whether the person had an adverse reaction. TR and TS belong to two different enterprises.
The researcher wants to get the answer to the following query.
select pattern, reaction, count(*) from TR, TS where TR.person id = TS.person id and TS.drug = "true" group by TR.pattern, TS.reaction
We want the property that the researcher should get to know the counts and nothing else, and the enterprises should not learn any new information about any individual.
Current Techniques
We discuss next some existing techniques that one might use for building the above applications, and why they are inadequate.
Trusted Third Party: The main parties give the data to a "trusted" third party and have the third party do the computation [7, 30] . However, the third party has to be completely trusted, both with respect to intent and competence against security breaches. The level of trust required is too high for this solution to be acceptable.
Secure Multi-Party Computation:
Given two parties with inputs x and y respectively, the goal of secure multi-party computation is to compute a function fx;y such that the two parties learn only fx; y, and nothing else. See [26, 34] for a discussion of various approaches to this problem.
Yao [49] showed that any multi-party computation can be solved by building a combinatorial circuit, and simulating that circuit. A variant of Yao's protocol is presented in [37] where the number of oblivious transfers is proportional to the number of inputs and not the size of the circuit. We show in Appendix A that our specialized algorithms are substantially faster than using a circuit, and in particular, the communication costs for circuits make them impractical for our problems.
Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We formally state the problem and the scope of this paper in Section 2. We develop the protocol for computing the intersection of two sets in Section 3, and extend this protocol for equijoins in Section 4. We describe the protocols for intersection size and equijoin size in Section 5. In Section 6, we give a cost analysis of these protocols, and use this analysis to estimate the execution times of the application examples above. We conclude with a summary and directions for future work in Section 7.
MINIMAL INFORMATION SHARING

Security Model
We develop our solutions in a setting in which there is no third party [26] . The main parties directly execute a protocol, which is designed to guarantee that they do not learn any more than they would have learnt had they given the data to a trusted third party and got back the answer.
We assume honest-but-curious behavior [26] . The parties follow the protocol properly with the exception that they may keep a record of all the intermediate computations and received messages, and analyze the messages to try to learn additional information. 
Figure 1: System Components
This behavior is also referred to as semi-honest or passive behavior. Figure 1 shows the different components required for building a system for information integration with minimal sharing. Our focus will be on the cryptographic protocol. We assume the use of standard libraries or packages for secure communication and encryption primitives.
Problem Statement
We now formally state the problem we study in this paper.
Problem Statement (Ideal)
Let there be two parties R (receiver) and S (sender) with databases DR and DS respectively. Given a database query Q spanning the tables in DR and DS, compute the answer to Q and return it to R without revealing any additional information to either party.
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Problem Statement (Minimal Sharing) Let there be two parties R and S with databases DR and DS respectively. Given a database query Q spanning the tables in DR and DS, and some categories of information I, compute the answer to Q and return it to R without revealing any additional information to either party except for information contained in I. 2
For example, if the query Q is a join TR 1 TS over two tables TR and TS, the additional information I might be the number of records in each table: jTRj and jTSj. Note that whatever R can infer from knowing the answer to the query Q and the additional information I is fair game. For instance, if the query Q is an intersection VS VR between two sets VS and VR, then for all v 2 VR , VS VR, R knows that these values were not in VS.
We assume that the query Q is revealed to both parties. One can think of other applications where the format of Q is revealed, but not the parameters of Q (e.g., in private information retrieval, discussed in Section 2.4).
Operations
In this paper, we focus on four operations: intersection, equijoin, intersection size, and equijoin size. Let S have a database table TS, and R have a table TR, with both tables having a specific attribute A in their schemas. The attribute A takes its values from a given set V . Let VS be the set of values (without duplicates) that occur in TS:A, and let VR be the set of values occurring in TR:A. For each v 2 VS, let extv be all records in TS where TS:A = v, i.e., extv is the extra information in TS pertaining to v. We show how to compute three kinds of queries over TS and TR:
Intersection: Party R learns the set VS VR, the value jVSj, and nothing else; party S learns jVRj and nothing else (Section 3).
Equijoin: Party R learns VS VR, extv for all v 2 VS VR, jVSj, and nothing else; party S learns jVRj and nothing else (Section 4).
Intersection Size: Party R learns the values of jVS VRj, jVSj, and nothing else; party S learns jVRj and nothing else (Section 5).
Thus in the terminology of our problem statement above, the query Q for the three problems corresponds to VS VR, TS 1 TR (with extv used to compute the join), and jVS VRj respectively. In all three cases, the additional information I consists of jVRj and jVSj.
We also extend the intersection size protocol to obtain an equijoin size protocol that computes jTS 1 TRj (Section 5.2). However, R learns jVSj, the distribution of duplicates in TS:A, and based on the distribution of duplicates, some subset of information in VS VR. S learns jVRj and the distribution of duplicates in TR:A.
Limitations
Multiple Queries While we provide guarantees on how much the parties learn from a single query, our techniques do not address the question of what the parties might learn by combining the results of multiple queries. The first line of defence against this problem is the scrutiny of the queries by the parties. In addition, query restriction techniques from the statistical database literature [1, 44] can also help. These techniques include restricting the size of query results [17, 23] , controlling the overlap among successive queries [19] , and keeping audit trails of all answered queries to detect possible compromises [13] .
Schema Discovery and Heterogeneity
We do not address the question of how to find which database contains which tables and what the attribute names are; we assume that the database schemas are known. We also do not address issues of schema heterogeneity. See [21, 29] and references therein for some approaches to these problems.
Related Work
In [35] , the authors consider the problem of finding the intersection of two lists while revealing only the intersection. They present two solutions: the first involves oblivious evaluations of n polynomials of degree n each, where n is the number of elements in the list; the second solution requires oblivious evaluation of n 2 linear polynomials. In the context of databases, n will be quite large.
In [28] , the authors consider the problem of finding people with common preferences, without revealing the preferences. They give intersection protocols that are similar to ours, but do not provide proofs of security.
In the problem of private information retrieval [11, 14, 15, 32, 45] , the receiver R obtains the ith record from set of n records held by the sender S without revealing i to S. With the additional restriction that R should only learn the value of one record, the problem becomes that of symmetric private information retrieval [25] . This literature will be useful for developing protocols for the selection operation in our setting. The problem of privacy-preserving data mining is also related. The randomization approach [6, 22, 40] focuses on individual privacy rather than on database privacy, and reveals randomized information about each record in exchange for not having to reveal the original records to anyone. More closely related is the work in [33] on building a decision-tree classifier across multiple databases, without revealing the individual records in each database to the other databases. Algorithms for mining associations rules across multiple databases have been described in [31] and [47] for hori-zontally and vertically partitioned data respectively.
The context for the work presented in this paper is our effort to design information systems that protect the privacy and ownership of individual information while not impeding the flow of information. Our other related papers include [2, 3, 4, 5 ].
INTERSECTION
A Simple, but Incorrect, Protocol
A straightforward idea for computing the intersection VS VR would be to use one-way hash functions [38] . Here is a simple protocol that appears to work:
1. Both S and R apply hash function h to their sets, yielding XS = hVS = fhv jv 2 VSg and XR = hVR = fhv jv 2 VRg: 2. S sends its hashed set XS to R.
3. R sets aside all v 2 VR for which hv 2 XS; these values form the set VS VR. Unfortunately, R can learn a lot more about VS (with honestbut-curious behavior). For any arbitrary value v 2 V ,VS VR, R can simply compute hv and check whether hv 2 XS to determine whether or not v 2 VS. In fact, if the domain V is small, R can exhaustively go over all possible values and completely learn VS.
The intersection protocol we propose next fixes the deficiencies of this protocol.
Building Blocks
We first describe two building blocks used in the proposed protocols.
Commutative Encryption
Our definition of commutative encryption below is similar to the constructions used in [9, 18, 20, 42] and others. Informally, a commutative encryption is a pair of encryption functions f and g such that fgv = gfv. Thus by using the combination fgv to encrypt v, we can ensure that R cannot compute the encryption of a value without the help of S. In addition, even though the encryption is a combination of two functions, each party can apply their function first and still get the same result.
DEFINITION 1 (INDISTINGUISHABILITY)
. Let k f 0; 1g k be a finite domain of k-bit numbers. Let D1 = D1 k and D2 = D2 k be distributions over k. Let Akx be an algorithm that, given x 2 k, returns either true or false. We define distribution D1 of random variable x 2 k to be computationally indistinguishable from distribution D2 if for any family of polynomial-step (w.r.t. k) algorithms Akx, any polynomial pk, and all sufficiently large k Pr Akx j x D 1 , Pr Akx j x D 2 1 pk where x D denotes that x is distributed according to D, and Pr Akx is the probability that Akx returns true.
Throughout this paper, we will use "indistinguishable" as shorthand for "computationally indistinguishable".
DEFINITION 2 (COMMUTATIVE ENCRYPTION). A commuta-
tive encryption F is a computable (in polynomial time) function f : Key F Dom F ! Dom F, defined on finite computable domains, that satisfies all properties listed below. We denote fex fe; x, and use "2r" to mean "is chosen uniformly at random from". 1. Commutativity: For all e; e 0 2 Key F we have fe f e 0 = f e 0 fe :
3. The inverse f ,1 e is also computable in polynomial time given e. 4 . The distribution of hx;fex; y ; f eyi is indistinguishable from the distribution of hx;fex;y ;z i, where x; y; z 2r Dom F and e 2r Key F.
Informally, Property 1 says that when we compositely encrypt with two different keys, the result is the same irrespective of the order of encryption. Property 2 says that two different values will never have the same encrypted value. Property 3 says that given an encrypted value fex and the encryption key e, we can find x in polynomial time. 1 Property 4 says that given a value x and its encryption fex (but not the key e), for a new value y, we cannot distinguish between fey and a random value z in polynomial time. Thus we can neither encrypt y nor decrypt fey in polynomial time. Note that this property holds only if x is a random value from Dom F, i.e., the adversary does not control the choice of x. Example 1 Let Dom F be all quadratic residues modulo p, where p is a "safe" prime number, i.e., both p and q = p , 1=2 are primes. Let Key F be f1; 2; : : :; q, 1g. Then, assuming the Decisional Diffie-Hellman hypothesis (DDH) [10] , the power function fex x e mod p is a commutative encryption:
The powers commute:
x d mod p e mod p = x de mod p = x e mod p d mod p.
Each of the powers fe is a bijection with its inverse being f ,1 e = f e ,1 modq .
DDH claims that for any generating (6 =1) element g 2 Dom F the distribution of hg a ; g b ; g ab i is indistinguishable from the distribution of hg a ; g b ; g c i, where a; b; c 2r Key F. A 3tuple hg a ; g b ; z i from the DDH can be reduced to our 4tuple hx;x e ; y ; z i by taking d 2r Key F and making tuple hg d ; g a d ; g b ; z i. Now a plays the role of e, g d of x, and g b of y; we test whether z = g b a or is random. Thus, given DDH, hx;x e ; y ; y e i and hx;x e ; y ; z i are also indistinguishable.
Hash Function
Besides a commutative encryption F, we need a hash function to encode the values v 2 V into x 2 Dom F. The hashes of values should not collide and should "look random," i.e., there should be no dependency between them that could help encrypt or decrypt one hashed value given the encryption of another. Since we apply commutative encryption to the hashed values hv instead of v, the input for the encryption function will appear random, and we will be able to use Property 4 of commutative encryption to prove that our protocols are secure.
In the proofs of our security statements we shall rely on the standard random oracle model [8, 24, 46] . We assume that our hash function h : V ! Dom F is ideal, which means that hv can be considered computed by a random oracle: every time hv is evaluated for a new v 2 V , an independent random x 2r Dom F is chosen for x = hv. 1 We only need this property for the join protocol, not for the intersection protocol.
We assume also that jDom Fjis so large compared to jVS VRj that the probability of a collision is exponentially small. Let N = jDom Fj; in the random oracle model, the probability that n hash values have at least one collision equals [46] :
With 1024-bit hash values, half of which are quadratic residues, we have N 2 1024 =2 10 307 , and for n = 1 million Pr collision 1 , exp , 10 12 10 307 10 12 10 307 = 1 0 ,295 : For real-life hash functions, a collision within VS or VR can be detected by the server at the start of each protocol by sorting the hashes. If there is a collision between v 2 VS and v 0 2 VR, it will cause inclusion of v 0 into the join (or intersection) by R and the disclosure to R of S's records containing v. 2
Intersection Protocol
Our proposed intersection protocol is as follows. which means that R does recover the correct set VS VR. Both parties also learn the sizes jVRj and jVSj, since jVRj = jYRj and jVSj = jYSj.
Next we prove that, assuming the parties follow the protocol correctly, they learn nothing else about the other's sets. We first show that even given Since D n j,1 and D n j are indistinguishable for 8j = m+1 : : : n , and because n is bounded by a polynomial, D n n is also indistinguishable from any D n m (where 0 6 m 6 n). Let Ak be an algorithm that pretends to distinguish D n n from D n m , and returns true or false. Now Pr AkT j T D n n , Pr AkT j T D n m (1) = n X j=m+1 Pr AkT j T D n j , Pr AkT j T D n j,1
Here k is the number of bits in the tuple values. Consider any polynomial pk; we want to prove that 9k0 8k k0 the difference (1) is bounded by 1=pk. Let p 0 k = n p k, which is also a polynomial. We have 8j = m+1 : : : n9kj 8k kj the j-th PROOF. We use a standard proof methodology from multi-party secure computation [26] . If, for any VS and VR, the distribution of the S's view of the protocol (the information S gets from R) cannot be distinguished from a simulation of this view that uses only VS and jVRj, then clearly S cannot learn anything from the inputs it gets from R except for jVRj. Note that the simulation only uses the knowledge S is supposed to have at the end of the protocol, while the distinguisher also uses the inputs of R (i.e., VR), but not R's secret keys (i.e., eR). It is important that the distinguisher be unable to distinguish between the simulation and the real view even given R's inputs: this precludes the kind of attack that broke the protocol given in Section 3. Next, the simulation adds jVS , VRj random values zi 2r Dom F to YS.
In Step 4(b), the simulation uses the keyẽS to encrypt each y 2 YR. 
EQUIJOIN
We now extend the intersection protocol so that, in addition to VS VR, R learns some extra information extv from S for values v 2 VS VR, but does not learn extv for for v 2 VS , VR. To compute the join TS 1 TR on attribute A, we have extv contain all the records of S's table where TS:A = v, i.e., extv contains the information about the other attributes in TS needed for the join.
Idea Behind Protocol
A simple, but incorrect, solution would be to encrypt the extra information extv using hv as the encryption key. Since, in our intersection protocol, hv could not be discovered by R except for v 2 VR (and similarly for S), one might think that this protocol would be secure. While it is true that hv cannot be discovered from YR or YS, hv can be discovered from the encryption of ext(v). For any arbitrary value v, R can compute hv and try decrypting all the extv using hv to learn whether or not v 2 VS.
In fact, if the domain is small, R can exhaustively go over all possible values and completely learn both VS and extv for v 2 VS.
Rather then encrypt the extra information with hv, we will encrypt it with a key v = f e 0 S hv, where e 0 S is a second secret key of S. The problem now is to allow R to learn v for v 2 VR without revealing VR to S. We do this as follows: R sends fe R hv to S, and S sends back f e 0 S fe R hv to R. R can now apply f ,1 e R to the latter to get f ,1 e R f e 0 S fe R hv = f ,1 e R fe R f e 0 S hv = f e 0 S hv:
Note that R only gets f e 0 S hv for v 2 VR, not for v 2 VS , VR.
Encryption Function K
We now formally define the encryption function K;extv that encrypts extv using the key v. K is defined to be a func- 
Kextv = extv:
The multiplication can be easily reversed given , and if is uniformly random then extv is also uniformly random (independently of extv).
Equijoin Protocol
Let VS be the set of values (without duplicates) that occur in TS:A, and let VR be the set of values that occur in TR:A. For each v 2 VS, let extv be all records in TS where TS:A = v. The pairs are then shipped to R in lexicographical order. 6. R applies f ,1 e R to all entries in the 3-tuples received at Step 4, obtaining hhv; f e S hv; f e 0 S hvi for all v 2 VR. 7. R sets aside all pairs hfe S hv; K f e 0 S hv;extvi received at Step 5 whose first entry occurs as a second entry in a 3-tuple hhv; f e S hv; f e 0 S hvi from Step 6. Using the third entry f e 0 S hv = v as the key, R decrypts Kf e 0 S hv; extv and gets extv. The corresponding v's form the intersection VS VR. 8 . R uses extv for v 2 VS VR to compute TS 1 TR. PROOF. This protocol is an extension of the intersection protocol, so it allows R to determine VS VR correctly. Since R learns the keys v for values in the intersection, R also gets extv for v 2 VS VR.
Proofs of Correctness and Security
Next we prove that R and S do not learn anything besides the above. We first extend Lemma 2 as follows. Analogously, the first and second lines in D3 and D2 are distributed like D n 0 and D n n respectively. The third line in both D3 and D2 can be obtained by using random numbers for the zi's. Therefore, by Lemma 2, D3 and D2 are also indistinguishable.
Finally, since both D1 and D2 are indistinguishable from D3, they themselves are indistinguishable.
The following lemma will be used in the proof for the security of the join protocol to show that the real and simulated views for R are indistinguishable. D 0 1 corresponds to the real view (for R), while D 0 2 corresponds to the simulated view. The first t columns correspond to VS ,VS VR, the next m,t columns to VS VR, and the last n , m columns to VR , VS VR. 8i : xi; y i; z i 2r Dom F and i = Kzi; c i:
Note that the zi for i = 1 : : : tare not included in the tuple, even though they are used to generate Kzi; c i.
The only difference between the two distributions D 0 2 and D 0 3 is that, for i = 1 : : : t , we replace i distributed as Dext with Kzi; c i where zi 2r Dom F; the rest of the matrix is independent and stays the same. Since zi is not a part of the matrix for PROOF. As in the proof of Statement 2, we will construct simulators of each party's view of the protocol, such that each simulator is given only what the party is supposed to learn, and such that the distribution of the real view is indistinguishable from the distribution of the simulated view.
The simulator for S is identical to that in Statement 2, since S gets exactly the same input from R as in the intersection protocol.
Hence the proof from Statement 2 directly applies.
The simulator for R (that simulates what R receives from S) can use h, eR, VR, VS VR, extv for v 2 VS VR, and jVSj. Let VS = fv1;: : :;v t; v t+1;: : :;v mg and VR = fvt+1; : : : ; v m; v m+1;: : :;v ng: So t = jVS , VRj, m = jVSj, and n = jVS VRj. Note that the simulator does not know the values in VS , VR.
In Step 4, the simulator generates n random numbers yi 2r Dom F, i = 1 : : : nas the simulated values for fe S hvi, and an additional n random numbers zi 2r Dom 
INTERSECTION AND JOIN SIZES
Intersection Size
We now show how the intersection protocol can be modified, such that R only learns the intersection size, but not which values in VR were present in VS. (Simply applying the intersection protocol would reveal the set VR VS, in addition to the intersection size.) Recall that in Step 4 of the intersection protocol, S sends back to R the values of y 2 YR together with their encryptions made by S.
These encryptions are paired with the unencrypted y's so that R can match the encryptions with R's values. If instead S sends back to R only the lexicographically reordered encryptions of the y's and not the y's themselves, R can no longer do the matching.
Intersection Size Protocol
We now present the protocol for intersection size. (Steps 1 through 3 are the same as in the intersection protocol.)
1. Both S and R apply hash function h to their sets: XS = hVS and XR = hVR:
Each party randomly chooses a secret key: eS 2r Key F for S and eR 2r Key F for R. 5. R encrypts each y 2 YS with eR, obtaining ZS = fe R fe S hVS.
6. Finally, R computes intersection size jZS ZRj, which equals jVS VRj. STATEMENT 5 . Assuming there are no hash collisions, S learns the size jVRj and R learns the size jVSj and the size jVS VRj.
Proofs of Correctness and Security
PROOF. The proof is very similar to that for Statement 1. Since fe S and fe R commute and are bijective, assuming that hash function h has no collisions on VS VR, jVS VRj = fe R fe S hVS fe S fe R hVR: Therefore R recovers the correct size jVS VRj. PROOF. We use the same methodology as in the proofs of Statement 2 and 4.
The simulator for S's view of the intersection size protocol is identical to that in Statement 2, since S gets exactly the same input from R as in the intersection protocol. Hence the proof from Statement 2 directly applies.
The simulator for R's view of the protocol is allowed to use VR, the hash function h, eR, and the numbers jVS VRj and jVSj; however, it has neither VS , VR nor VS VR. Let VS = fv1; : : : ; v t; v t+1;: : :;v mg and VR = fvt+1;: : :;v m; v m+1;: : :;v ng: So t = jVS , VRj, m = jVSj, and n = jVS VRj.
The simulator generates n random numbers y1; : : :; y n 2r Dom F which play the role of fe S hv for all v 2 VS VR.
The key eS is not simulated, and no decision is made about which yi stands for which fe S hv. In Step 4(a) , the simulation creates YS as YS = fy1; : : :; y mg: 
Equijoin Size
To evaluate equijoin size, we follow the intersection size protocol, except that we allow VR and VS to be multi-sets, i.e., contain duplicates, and then compute the join size instead of the intersection size in Step 6. However, R can now use the number of duplicates of a given value to partially match values in YR with their corresponding encryptions in ZR. We now characterize exactly what R and S learn in this protocol (besides jVRj, jVSj and jVR 1 VSj).
To start with, R learns the distribution of duplicates in VS, and S learns the distribution of duplicates in VR. To characterize what else R learns, let us partition the values in VR based on the number of duplicates, i.e., in a partition VRd, each v 2 VRd has d duplicates. Then, for each partition, R learns jVRd VSd 0 j for each partition VSd 0 of VS. Thus if all values have the same number of duplicates (e.g., no duplicates as in our intersection protocol), R only learns jVR VSj. At the other extreme, if no two values have the same number of duplicates, R will learn VR VS.
COST ANALYSIS
Protocols
Let each encrypted codeword (in Dom F) be k bits long, Ch denote the cost of evaluating the hash function, Ce denote the cost of encryption/decryption by F (e.g., exponentiation "x y mod p" over k-bit integers), CK denote the cost of encryption/decryption by K (e.g., encoding/decoding as a quadratic residue and multiplication), and n log n Cs be the cost of sorting a set of n encryptions.
We assume the obvious optimizations when computing the computation and communication costs. For example, in the join protocol, we assume that the protocol does not decrypt y to hv in
Step 6, but uses order preservation for matching. Also, in all the protocols, S does not retransmit the y's back but just preserves the original order.
Computation The computation costs are:
Intersection: Ch + 2 CejVSj + jVRj + 2 CsjVSj log jVSj + 3 CsjVRj log jVRj Join: ChjVSj + jVRj + 2 CejVSj + 5 CejVRj + CKjVSj + jVS VRj + 2 CsjVSj log jVSj + 3 CsjVRj log jVRj We can assume Ce Ch, Ce CK, and nCe n log n Cs, so these formulae can be approximated by Intersection: jVSj + 2 jVRj k bits Join: jVSj + 3 jVRj k + jVSj k 0 bits, where k 0 is the size of the encrypted extv.
Both the intersection size and join size protocols have the same computation and communication complexity as the intersection protocol.
Applications
We now estimate the execution times for the applications in Section 1.1.
For the cost of Ce (i.e., cost of x y mod p), we use the times from [36] : 0.02s for 1024-bit numbers on a Pentium III (in 2001).
This corresponds to around 210 5 exponentiations per hour. We assume that communication is via a T1 line, with bandwidth of 1.544 Mbits/second ( 5 Gbits/hour).
Encrypting the set of values is trivially parallelizable in all three protocols. We assume that we have P processors that we can utilize in parallel: we will use a default value of P = 1 0 .
VR := ids in TR. V 0 R := subset of VR that match the DNA sequence. VS := ids in TS that took the drug. V 0 S := subset of VS with adverse reaction.
T gets IntersectionSize(VR , V 0 R ; VS , V 0 S ). 
Selective Document Sharing
Recall that we have two databases DR and DS, where each database contains a set of documents, and a document consists of a set of significant words. We wish to find all pairs of documents dR 2 DR and dS 2 DS such that, for some similarity function f and threshold , fjdR dSj; jdRj;jdSj . For example, f could be jdR dSj=jdRj + jdSj.
Implementation R and S execute the intersection size protocol for each pair of documents dR 2 DR and dS 2 DS to get jdR dSj, jdRj and jdSj; they then compute the similarity function f. For S, in addition to the number of documents jDSj, this protocol also reveals to R for each document dR 2 DR, which documents in DS matched dR, and the size of jdR dSj for each document dS 2 DS.
Cost Analysis For a given pair of documents dR and dS, the computation time is jdRj + jdSj2Ce, and the data transferred is jdRj + 2 jdSj k bits. Thus the total cost is:
Computation: jDRj j DSj jdRj + jdSj 2Ce. Communication: jDRj j DSj jdRj + 2 jdSj k. If jDRj = 1 0 documents, DS = 100 documents, and jdRj = jdSj = 1000 words, the computation time will be 410 6 Ce=P 2 hour. The data transferred will be 3 10 6 k 3 Gbits 35 minutes.
Medical Research
Recall that we wish to get the answer to the query select pattern, reaction, count(*) from TR, TS where TR.id = TS.id and TS.drug = true group by TR.pattern, TS.reaction where TR and TS are tables in two different enterprises.
Implementation Figure 2 shows the implementation algorithm. We use a slightly modified version of the intersection size protocol where ZR and ZS are sent to T, the researcher, instead of to S and R. Note that whenever we have, say, VR , V 0 R inside Intersec-tionSize, the set difference is computed locally, and the result is the input to the protocol.
Cost Analysis
The combined cost of the four intersections is 2jVRj+jVSj2Ce, and the data transferred is 2jVRj+jVSj2k bits. If jVRj = jVSj = 1 million, the total computation time will be 810 6 Ce=P 4 hours. The total communication time will be 810 6 k 8 Gbits 1.5 hours.
CONCLUSIONS
We identified information integration with minimal sharing as a new area for future database research. We developed novel protocols for three key operations: intersection, intersection size, and equijoin and proved that these protocols disclose minimal information apart from the query result. We also gave a protocol for computing equijoin size, but this protocol leaks some information about which tuples joined, based on the distribution of duplicates. We also showed how new applications can be built using the proposed protocols.
Some interesting directions for future research include: What is the tradeoff between the additional information being disclosed and efficiency? Will we be able to obtain much faster protocols if we are willing to disclose additional information?
Can we formalize models of minimal disclosure and discover corresponding protocols for other database operations such as aggregations?
APPENDIX A. CIRCUIT-BASED PROTOCOLS
For comparison, we estimate the computation and communication cost of intersection and join protocols obtained using the semihonest variant of Yao's protocol described in [33, 37] . Let VS and VR contain w-bit values. Consider a function fx; y that takes vectorsx andỹ (of size w j VSj and w j VRj respectively) as inputs and returns a vectorz (of size jVRj) that shows which of R's values also belong to VS. This function can be represented by a circuit of boolean gates. S hardwires its inputx into the circuit and supplements each possible encrypted bit value at each circuit wire with its own random key (used for decrypting the next gate's output and its key). The protocol has two major steps:
Coding R's input: For each bit ofỹ, R engages with S in a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol [36, 39] and gets the corresponding supplemental keys.
Computing the circuit: For each gate, R receives a table from
S and, using the keys for the gate's inputs, computes the output and its key. In the process, R applies a pseudorandom function twice per each output wire.
To get fx; y, R gets the tables that allow it to decrypt the wires with the output of the circuit.
A.1 Cost Analysis
Let the keys (for the circuit gates) be k0 bits long, and Cr be the cost of pseudorandom function evaluation. We assume that w = 3 2 (recall that w is the size in bits of the input values), k0 = 6 4 , and jVRj = jVSj = n.
A.1.1 Coding the Input
Let Cot be the computation cost of each oblivious transfer, and C 0 ot its communication cost. An efficient protocol for oblivious transfers is given in [36] . For any integer l 0, this paper gives a protocol with amortized cost
where C is the cost of multiplication, and k1 is the size of the keys used in oblivious transfer. We assume k1 = 100 [36] . Assume that Ce = 1000 C; then the best choice with respect to the computation time is l = 8 , and the costs become Cot = 0 :157 Ce; C 0 ot 32 k1 :
Cost The computation cost of coding the input is w j VRj Cot = 3 2 n 0:157 Ce 5 n C e and the communication cost is w j VRj C 0 ot 32 n 32 k1 10 5 n A.1.2 Evaluating the Circuit Let Cw;jVSj; jVRj be the total number of gates required for the circuit. We estimate lower bounds on the number of gates required for a brute force algorithm, and a more efficient partitioning algorithm.
Let Ge be the number of gates required to compare two w-bit numbers in the circuit to determine whether they are equal. Let Gl be the number of gates required to determine which number is less than (or equal to) the other.
Brute Force Circuit Consider a circuit that compares every number in VR with every number in VS, and then merges the results to output just the numbers in VR that were equal to at least one number in VS. The number of gates Cw;jVSj; jVRj in this circuit is greater than jVRj j VSj Ge:
Partitioning Circuit We assume that each set VR and VS is given to the circuit in the form of an ordered array, with all duplicates removed. Instead of comparing all pairs of numbers, we can split these arrays into m intervals (non-interleaving subarrays) of size jVRj=m and jVSj=m. For ease of exposition, we assume that jVRj = jVSj = n, and that n is a power of m.
Out of all possible m 2 pairs of subarrays, with one subarray from VS and the other from VR, only at most 2m , 1 pairs may have a nonempty intersection; the others are pairs of non-interleaving subarrays. To see this, note that in a pair of interleaving subarrays the beginning of one subarray must be within the interval spanned by the other. There is at most one pair per one such "internal beginning." There are 2m subarrays in both VS and VR, each having only one beginning; and the smallest beginning is always "wasted," thus limiting the number of interleaving pairs to 2m , 1 .
The circuit has to choose the 2m , 1 interleaving pairs of subarrays and then use recursion to compute set intersections within these pairs. To check whether a pair of subarrays interleaves, we need to compare the smallest and largest numbers of these subarrays, thus making 2 comparisons. There are m 2 pairs, so we need 2m 2 comparisons, and hence 2m 2 Gl gates. Additional gates are needed to reroute the subarrays and combine the recursive outputs, but we shall ignore them in our estimation, since we are interested primarily in a lower bound for the cost of the circuit (using this algorithm).
Let fn be the cost of the circuit. Then fn The brute force circuit does much worse, with Cw;jVRj;jVSj equal to 6:310 9 , 6:310 13 , and 6:310 17 respectively.
Cost For each gate in the circuit, R gets a table from S whose size is 4k0, and evaluates 2 pseudorandom functions. Therefore the computation cost of circuit evaluation is 2Cr Cw;jVSj; jVRj = 2 Crfn and the communication cost is 4k0 Cw;jVSj; jVRj = 256 fn:
A.2 Comparison with Our Protocol
Computation We get the following computation costs: The cost of coding the input for the circuit is slightly higher than the cost of our protocol. The total cost of the circuit (relative to our protocol) depends on the ratio of Ce to Cr. While Ce Cr, there are 10 4 to 10 5 as many calls to Cr as there are to Ce. Thus our protocol will be substantially faster if Cr C e=10000, and slightly faster otherwise.
Communication The communication costs (in bits) are:
n Circuit Our Protocol Input (OT) Circuit (Tables)   10 4 10 9 6:010 10 310 7 10 6 10 11 1:810 13 310 9 10 8 10 13 4:910 15 310 11 The circuit-based protocol requires 1000 to 10; 000 times as much communication as our protocol. For n = 1 million, the communication time for the circuit-based protocol is 144 days (using a T1 line), versus 0.5 hours for our protocol. The communication cost makes the circuit-based protocol impractical for database-size applications.
